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The Law of Unintended Consequences: The 2015 E.U.
Insolvency Regulation and Employee Claims in CrossBorder Insolvencies
Joshua W. Eastby

Abstract
The European Union recently amended its Regulation on insolvency proceedings to
implement lessons learned during the previous iteration’s lifespan. However, its interaction with
the E.U.’s Guarantee Mandate leads to unintended consequences in cross-border insolvencies
that can frustrate the animating principles of both laws. This Comment argues for a dynamic
approach to Member States’ guarantee funds under the Guarantee Mandate that will pay
employee claims according to national law, rather than allowing the claim to be governed wholly
by the law of the State administering the insolvency proceedings. This change will eliminate the
disparate impact that changing substantive law can have on otherwise similarly-situated
employees, while at the same time allowing Member States to internalize the costs of the disparate
legal regimes, allowing them to more fully realize their national policy choices and allocate the
internalized costs to the various stakeholders as they see fit. This change would reduce the costs
disparately imposed on employees based solely on where their employer is headquartered, and
increase the efficiency of the cross-border insolvency administration process.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Consider the case of a firm that has fallen on hard times. At one point, it
was profitable, and the demand for its services was robust. Now, though, whether
because of market shocks, mismanagement, or a changing marketplace, the firm
is not as financially healthy as it has been in the past. The firm has found itself
insolvent—unable to repay its obligations as they become due—and, in fact, has
stopped making payments entirely. At this point, some form of legal proceeding
would be used either to liquidate the firm, repaying such of its obligations as the
firm’s assets will permit, or to restructure the firm to get it back on the path to
regular operation.1 In the case of liquidation, the creditors of the firm would file
claims seeking payment out of the debtor’s remaining assets.2 Generally, the State
in which the insolvency proceeding takes place would provide the governing law,
determining, among other things, the order in which claims are prioritized.3
Because of the high variability in insolvency regimes and fundamental policy
choices across States, the initial choice of where to open the insolvency
proceedings can have a large effect on the distributional outcome of the
insolvency proceedings.4
1

2
3

4

See, for example, Council Regulation 2015/848, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19 (EU), pmbl. (7), (10), art. 1(1)
[hereinafter “E.U. Regulation”] (noting that “[b]ankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up
of insolvent companies or other legal person, [etc.] . . . should be covered by this Regulation”; and
further that “[t]he scope of this Regulation should extend to proceedings which promote the rescue
of economically viable but distressed businesses and which give a second chance to entrepreneurs”).
In the United States, the Bankruptcy Code provides a number of methods of relief, including
“Chapter 7 (liquidation) . . . [and] Chapter 11 (reorganization).” See, for example, Craig Peyton
Gaumer & Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth or Consequences: The Dilemma of Asserting the Fifth Amendment
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 506 (1997). See also 11
U.S.C. §§ 701–84, 1101–74 (2014).
See, for example, E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 45(1)–(3).
See, for example, id. art. 7(1)–(2) (“Save as otherwise provided . . . the law applicable to insolvency
proceedings and their effects shall be that of the Member State within the territory of which such
proceedings are opened.”).
Cf. id. As an illustrative example of the types of disparate outcomes that result from changing which
State’s laws apply, see JANIS SARRA, EMPLOYEE AND PENSION CLAIMS DURING COMPANY
INSOLVENCY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 62 JURISDICTIONS 3 (2008) [hereinafter SARRA STUDY].
For example, a German employee of a German company will be subject to German law in their
employer’s insolvency proceedings; German law provides for no preference at any level for
employee claims in insolvency. See id. at 249–50. Likewise, French law governs the claims of a
French company’s employees, and French law grants strong protection to employee claims, giving
them a super-priority over all other forms of preferential debt. Id. at 237–38. However, under the
E.U. Regulation, a French employee of a German company would receive no priority, though an
identically-situated French employee of a French company would. Id.; E.U. Regulation, supra note
1 art. 7(1)–(2). Even for States with somewhat similar insolvency regimes (e.g., two States that grant
priority to employee claims), the outcome can still vary significantly. For example, Croatia provides
a priority for employee claims ahead of all other unsecured claims, but behind secured claims and

Summer 2016

123

Chicago Journal of International Law

Of particular interest in this Comment is the protection employee claims
receive in insolvency proceedings. Employees are nearly always afforded some
sort of preferential treatment in insolvency proceedings, but the precise details of
the legal regimes and the differing limitations imposed by States on employee
claims entitled to this preferential treatment result in a wide degree of variance
with regards to the outcome of employee claims in insolvency proceedings.5
The high degree of variability between national insolvency regimes was recently
acutely felt in the highly interconnected markets of the European Union (E.U.).
In 2015, the E.U. enacted the E.U. Regulation, which was designed to incorporate
some of the lessons learned from implementing its predecessor enacted only
fifteen years prior.6 During the same period, the E.U. enacted the Guarantee
Mandate.7 The E.U. Regulation sought to standardize and streamline the
administration of insolvency proceedings, and did so via a regime of mandatory
coordination and choice of law rules.8 Recognizing the necessity of protecting
employees when their employers become insolvent, the Guarantee Mandate
requires that E.U. Member States establish guarantee funds that provide for a
minimum level of payment for employee claims.9 Member States can set a level of
guarantee higher than, but not less than, the minimum.10
The unintended consequence11 of the interaction between these related, but
separately-developed, legal regimes, however, is that Member States can

5

6

7

8
9
10
11

claims against the estate. SARRA STUDY, at 205. Thus, a French employee of a Croatian company
would be in a worse position than a French employee of a French company, whereas a Croatian
employee of a French company would receive a windfall.
Id. at 9–10, 130 (2008) (“[T]he issue of social claims[, i.e., employee claims,] has received
considerable public attention in numerous jurisdictions . . . . Globally, there has been recognition
that the problems faced by employees on insolvency are somewhat unique, and require special
attention in the course of liquidation or restructuring of the financially distressed business.”). See
also id. at 4 (noting that the “World Bank has called for special treatment of employee claims during
insolvency, recognizing that workers are a vital part of an enterprise”).
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 at pmbl. (1). In 2000, the E.U. promulgated the E.C. Regulation,
which attempted to streamline the coordination and administration of insolvencies that presented
with cross-border issues. Council Regulation 1346/2000, of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency
Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter “E.C. Regulation”].
Directive 2008/98/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 22 October 2008 on
the Protection of Employees in the Event of the Insolvency of Their Employer, 2008 O.J. (L 283)
36 [hereinafter “Guarantee Mandate”]. The Guarantee Mandate resulted from a similar process of
successive amendments to the original Directive before ultimately being recast in its current form.
Compare Guarantee Mandate with Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 on the
Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Protection of Employees in the
Event of the Insolvency of Their Employer 1980 O.J. (L 283) 23.
See generally E.U. Regulation, supra note 1.
See Guarantee Mandate, at pmbl (3), art. 3.
See generally Guarantee Mandate.
Cf. Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV. 894,
894–904 (1936).
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customize their domestic insolvency proceedings in ways that produce negative
distributional consequences for employees based on where their employer is
headquartered.12 Member States can choose to have a higher level of guarantee
than the Guarantee Mandate requires, and they can elect to have a priority in the
insolvency proceeding13 in addition to the Guarantee Mandate’s required level of
protection. Thus, so long as their guarantee fund pays at least the minimum
required by the Guarantee Mandate, they can customize their insolvency regime
according to their national policy choices.14
The problem arises when a company headquartered in a non-prioritygranting State employs citizens of a priority-granting State.15 In this situation,
employees in a priority-granting State “A” receive differential treatment
depending on where their employer is headquartered. An employee of a domestic
company will receive the payment from the guarantee fund as well as the priority
in the insolvency proceeding, whereas an otherwise identically situated employee
working for a company headquartered in a non-priority-granting State “B” would
receive the payment from the guarantee fund, but no priority in insolvency.16
In cases where the debtor’s assets located in the priority-granting Member
State “A” are sufficient to satisfy the employees’ claims, the difference in
applicable law does not affect the employees’ recovery. This is not the case,
however, in situations where the debtor has assets sufficient to satisfy the secured
creditors and with at least some amount left for unsecured creditors. When the
unsecured creditors are not paid in full, the change in applicable law between the
12

13

14
15
16

See infra Section II(D)(1). For analytical clarity, this Comment uses the term “headquartered” as a
stand-in for Center of Main Interest (“COMI”). This is not to detract from the interesting analytical
questions posed by COMI determinations. See, for example, Richard Sheldon, QC, Introduction to
CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY 1, 8 (Richard Sheldon, ed., 3d ed. 2011). See also, for example, Mark
Arnold, The Insolvency Regulation, in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY 16, 16–97 (Richard Sheldon, ed.,
3d ed. 2011) (analyzing the E.C. Regulation, and discussing how the COMI is determined
thereunder).
The default positioning of employee claims in insolvency is that of the unsecured creditor;
unsecured creditors only take from the insolvency distribution to the extent that the claims of
secured creditors and claims against the debtor’s estate (claims that arose after the commencement
of the insolvency proceedings) have been satisfied in full. See, for example, Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U CHI. L.
REV. 738, 738 & n. 1 (1988) (discussing the origins of the absolute priority rule in American law).
Of course, variations of this ordering occur by virtue of national policy choices, but absent an
affirmative pronouncement of national law, generally all claims—including employee claims—are
unsecured.
Id. See also Guarantee Mandate arts. 2(4), 11.
See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7(i) (noting that the Member State of the opening of main
proceedings supplies the governing law for priorities and the ranking of claims).
See Guarantee Mandate art. 9; E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7. The E.U. Regulation provides
the general choice of law rule for insolvency proceedings, and the Guarantee Mandate provides for
which guarantee fund pays an employee’s claim, but it is possible under these provisions for those
bodies of law to be different.
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two States can lead to a vastly different outcome for employee-claimants that are
identically situated but for the State in which their employer is headquartered.17
The E.U. Regulation’s provision for the law of the State of the primary
insolvency proceeding to control the insolvency process can lead to vastly
different distributional outcomes for employees in non-main jurisdictions.18 This
counterintuitive treatment of employee claims can operate to defeat the purpose
of the policy choices that Member States make as to the proper level of protection
due employee claims, expressed via the outlet for national law incorporated into
the E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee Mandate.19 If a Member State determines
that employees are entitled to a priority under domestic law, they are no less
worthy of that protection simply because their employer is headquartered
abroad.20 As such, harmonizing the goal of the Guarantee Mandate with the
procedure and choice of law provisions of the E.U. Regulation can be
accomplished by a change in the procedure Member States’ guarantee funds
follow when satisfying employee claims.
Instead of having the guarantee funds simply pay a fixed amount, leaving the
balance of an employee’s claim to be satisfied in part, if at all, in the primary
17

18

19

20

To wit, when an employee in a priority-granting State possesses a residual claim (that is, a claim that
is not fully satisfied by the insurance fund and the assets located domestically) against the debtor,
and the debtor’s assets are subject to an insolvency proceeding in a non-priority State, the balance
of the employee’s claim will be governed by the non-priority legal regime. This, despite the fact that
an identically-situated employee of a domestic company would have the full value of her claim
governed by the priority-granting domestic law.
See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 3(1) (“In the case of a company . . . the place of the registered
office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the
contrary.”). In the United States, an analogous concept is the “nerve center” test that indicates the
proper court for jurisdiction over a corporation. See, for example, Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77
(2010).
Neither the E.U. Regulation nor the Guarantee Mandate operates to prohibit Member States from
enacting “hybrid” priority-guarantee regimes, and Member States are likewise able to enact
guarantee regimes that provide greater protection for employee claims than the minimum.
However, when operating together, these policy choices can be frustrated by an inconsistent change
in the applicable law.
The two major areas in which employment research is being conducted appear to be temporary
relocation of employees (so-called “posted” workers) within the E.U. and labor mobility;
quantitative measures of the prevalence of companies employing workers in foreign companies (to
staff the companies’ operations in that foreign company) does not appear to be an area to which
international study has been directed. Cf, for example, Roberto Pedersini & Massimo Pallini, Posted
Workers in the European Union, EURO. FOUND. FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING
CONDITIONS (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork
/comparative-information/posted-workers-in-the-european-union; Labor Mobility Within the E.U.,
EURO. COMM’N (Sept. 25, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-541_en.htm.
There is a wealth of data available on the pertinent economic characteristics of the employee’s side
of the E.U.’s economic equation, but, alas, there is little data available concerning the employer’s
side. See EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT (LABOUR FORCE SURVEY), http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/web/lfs/data/database (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
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insolvency proceeding, this Comment argues that Member States should employ
a dynamic approach to protecting employee claims in insolvency proceedings.
Under such an approach, guarantee funds would pay employee claims at the level
to which they would be entitled if the insolvency proceeding were being wholly
administered in domestic courts and subject to domestic law. The guarantee fund
would become subrogated to the employee’s claim against the debtor, and the
employee could still lodge a claim for any residual amount of their claim that was
not paid out of the debtor’s local assets and the guarantee fund payments. As a
result, the amount of the claim against the debtor would not change, it would just
be bifurcated into two sub-types: (1) claims lodged by the guarantee funds, having
become subrogated to the original employee claim; and (2) deficiency claims
lodged by employees. The guarantee fund lodging the subrogated claim in the
primary insolvency proceeding would receive the amount to which the employee
would have been entitled, which would defray the payment the fund made to the
employee in the first place. This method would protect all employee claims to the
fullest extent that Member States deem prudent, fully expressing their chosen
policy judgments by eliminating the disparity visited upon employees based solely
on where their employer is headquartered.21
This procedural change would result in the realization of several benefits that
more fully achieve the motivating goals of the E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee
Mandate in the first place, gains which form the ultimate focus of this Comment.
Member States will more fully realize the policy choices they make as to the
appropriate level of protection for employees of insolvent firms, while at the same
time fully internalizing the costs of their policy choices rather than imposing
externalities on other parties.22 Finally, Member States will be better able to
apportion those costs how they see fit: either spreading them across the national
economy as a whole or apportioning the costs by industry according to the
Member State’s assessment of the riskiness of each industry.23
In Section II, this Comment will frame the issue considered herein and set
out the relevant changes incorporated in the E.U. Regulation as informed by the
Guarantee Mandate. Section III will show that the Guarantee Mandate allows for
an important outlet for national policy choices in the E.U.-wide insolvency regime.
21

22
23

This is so because, instead of some subset of employee claims receiving less protection than the
Member States had previously determined they warranted, all employee claims would receive the
level of protection they would receive under domestic law.
See infra Section IV(B).
See infra Section IV(B). As a matter of first impression, it appears that the apportioned approach
that takes account of the riskiness of individual industries would be preferable as a means of
requiring firms within each industry to internalize (and thus account for) the risk that they will
become insolvent and impose costs on their employees, some of the most vulnerable stakeholders
in the enterprise. However, this assessment of the optimal means of allocating the costs of
guaranteeing employee claims in insolvency is outside the scope of this Comment, and perhaps a
valuable subject for future analysis.
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The E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee Mandate operate in some cases to
increase the protection of employees when firms become insolvent. However,
certain elements of the E.U. Member States’ national insolvency regimes can,
when coupled with the E.U. Regulation’s choice of law provisions, lead to
employees of companies with foreign headquarters receiving disparate treatment
relative to employees of domestic firms. In Section IV the Comment advances
that a change in the way the Guarantee Mandate is implemented by Member States
is necessary in order to eliminate the disparate effects that the E.U. Regulation’s
choice of law provisions can have when claims from Member States with one
particular approach to protecting employees in insolvency are administered by
courts in Member States with differing approaches. It is argued that this change
will more effectively express the Member States’ policy choices, more fully align
the costs of policy choices with their selection and implementation, and increase
the gains to efficiency sought by the E.U.’s regulatory scheme in the first instance.
Section V briefly concludes.

II. F RAMING THE P ROBLEM : T HE E.U. R EG ULATION AND THE
G UARANTEE M ANDATE
This Section will discuss the development of the E.U.-wide insolvency
regime consisting of the E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee Mandate, with a brief
consideration of the historical origins of these pronouncements, before turning to
the interaction between the two laws and the harmful effects that can result from
their different approaches to the choice of law problem. Throughout it will be
shown that the unique situation of employees in the cross-border insolvency
regime justify the revision of Member States’ implementation of the Guarantee
Mandate in order to mitigate the harsh impacts that changing national laws would
otherwise have.

A. Cross-Border Insolvency: A Brief Conceptual History
In a single-State insolvency, the legal differences between States would
matter little—it is easy to imagine that a State’s insolvency regime would be one
of the factors a firm considered when deciding whether to conduct business
there—and choice of law issues would not arise.24 Coordinating the proceedings
24

See, for example, FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 2 (1991) (“The founders and managers of a firm . . . . choose where to incorporate
(states have different legal rules).”). See also id. at 5–6 (“Managers in the United States must select
the place of incorporation . . . The managers who pick the state of incorporation that is most
desirable from the perspective of investors will attract the most money.”). Judge Easterbrook and
Professor Fischel deal with United States corporate law, but it is a general proposition of a
conceptualization of the market for corporate law that the founders of corporations are rational
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becomes significantly more complex, however, when more than one body of law
is, or could be, applicable. Because insolvency law is primarily a State-level regime,
no two insolvency regimes are precisely the same.25 Differences in national
insolvency regimes become important in at least two increasingly common
situations.

1. The archetypal cross-border insolvency.
First, in situations where multinational firms have assets located in foreign
States, it is not immediately clear what body of law should govern in an eventual
insolvency proceeding.26 Where a firm is headquartered in one State and
significant assets exist elsewhere, the law that actually governs the insolvency
proceedings in the foreign States could plausibly be the law of the State in which
the assets are located27 or the law of the State of the debtor’s headquarters.28
Second, a similar situation exists where a business entity has creditors in
multiple States. In these situations, the possibility exists that insolvency
proceedings may be instituted in any number of viable (if not strictly convenient)
fora, including the State of the debtor’s headquarters or any of the States in which
the creditors are principally located.29 In both situations, the court reviewing the
insolvency petition must determine the law to apply, which can have profound
effects on the eventual distribution of assets to the creditors.30

25

26
27
28
29

30

actors, evaluating, among other things, the legal regime under which they would be incorporating.
This does not change if the relevant choices for incorporation are States rather than U.S. states.
See generally, for example, José M. Garrido, No Two Snowflakes the Same: The Distributional Question in
International Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 459 (2011) (discussing the wide variety of differences in
policy choices in international insolvency regimes). The E.U. Regulation is one example of attempts
made by the international community to respond to the increasingly globalized marketplace, and
the issues it poses for a legal regime primarily located at the national level.
See JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, CHARLES D. BOOTH, CHRISTOPH G. PAULUS & HARRY RAJAK, A
GLOBAL VIEW OF BUSINESS INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS 227–28 (2010).
See, for example, Jeremy Goldring, Priorities and Set-Offs, in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY 515–24, 516.
This is termed the lex situs. Id.
Id. at 515–16. This is termed the lex fori. Id.
The E.U. Regulation attempts to curtail some of the potential for gamesmanship by providing that,
in the case of a legal person, the COMI, and thus the appropriate venue for the main insolvency
proceeding, is the place of registered office. See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 3(1). It should be
noted, however, that this rule can be rebutted, and the lex situs still applies in certain specific
instances. For example, lex situs applies in the case of contracts relating to immovable property and
rights subject to registration (e.g., aircraft and ships). See id. at arts. 3(1), (11), (14). Indeed, the E.U.
Regulation indicates that the prevention of forum shopping by shifting assets between jurisdictions
is one of the main motivating factors behind having an E.U.-wide insolvency regime. See id. at
pmbl.(5).
SARRA STUDY, supra note 4. It is also useful to note that, generally speaking, parties to a contract
have the ability to agree as to which jurisdiction’s laws shall govern the rights under that contract.
In the E.U., such agreements are allowed for most contracts, excluding certain “consumer
contracts.” See Axel Gehringer, After Carnival Cruise and Sky Reefer: An Analysis of Forum Selection
Clauses in Maritime and Aviation Transactions, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 633, 678–79 (2001) (citing
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In the above situations, then, the choice of law rule is important primarily
because the governing law largely determines the outcome of the insolvency
distribution.31 The fact that insolvency regimes are primarily a matter of national
policy choices means that determinations of national social and economic policy,
historical developments, and even the basic structure of the national institutions
can drastically affect the resulting insolvency regime.32

2. Territoriality and universality—two major approaches to crossborder insolvency.
When faced with multi-jurisdictional insolvencies, courts have historically
approached this issue in two major ways.33 The first is to treat the assets in each
State as subject to the operation of that State’s laws. This “territoriality” doctrine
holds that courts of one State have jurisdiction only over those assets located
within the State.34 This necessarily means that a State’s court has jurisdiction only
over assets located within that State, and thus a creditor seeking satisfaction from
all of the debtor’s assets must lodge claims in all States in which the debtor’s assets
are located. 35
The other major approach has been to treat the assets of the debtor,
wherever located, as controlled by the laws of the State administering the
insolvency proceedings.36 This “universality” doctrine holds that the State most
competent to administer the insolvency is that in which the firm is
headquartered.37
As international trade became more complex, and cross-border commerce
more prevalent, cross-border insolvencies administered under the “pure”
territoriality and “pure” universality doctrines became less practical, and the desire
for change prompted various iterations of what eventually became known as the

31
32

33
34
35
36
37

Convention Concerning Judicial Competence and the Execution of Decisions in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1262 U.N.T.S. 20747). The Convention Gehringer cites has
been updated substantially since its initial conclusion, and the new E.U. regulations governing
forum selection clauses are found in various articles of Chapter II of the 2012 recast of the Brussels
I Regulation. See Regulation 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (EU).
See SARRA STUDY, supra note 4.
See generally SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 3–130. See also id. at 126–30 (noting the variety of different
policy justifications that lead States to customize their insolvency regime differently along a number
of axes ranging from the precise protections afforded employees, the methods of providing funding
for those protections, and the extent to which directors and officers of the debtor are held liable
for those claims, to name a few).
See, for example, WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 229–31.
See, for example, Garrido, supra note 25 at 467.
Id.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 471–72.
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“modified universalism” doctrine.38 This approach attempts to accommodate
local interests in the insolvency process while still reaping some of the efficiency
benefits that centralized insolvency administration can produce.39 Modified
universalism has been the theoretical approach employed most often in the
international community’s attempts at harmonizing the disparate insolvency
regimes of the various States engaged in high volumes of international trade.40

B. The Development of the E.U. Regulation
The E.U. Regulation was not the first attempt at harmonizing disparate State
laws pertaining to insolvency. The first developments in international insolvency
rulemaking were the International Bar Association’s Cross-Border Insolvency
Concordat, its predecessor, the Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act
(MIICA), and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.41 The E.U. Regulation
embraces the modified universality approach in an attempt to harmonize the
insolvency regimes of its Member States while still respecting the sovereignty
Member States reserve over areas of national policy.42

1. The adoption of the E.U. Regulation.
The E.U. initially incorporated the UNCITRAL Model Law into E.U. law
on May 29, 2000.43 The E.U. sought to establish an E.U.-wide regime designed to
promote uniformity and stability among the E.U. Member States.44
38
39

40
41

42
43

44

Id.
Id. at 471 (“‘Modified Universalism’ is an accepted term . . . that refers to a universalist approach in
which some concessions are made to territorial interests for the sake of ensuring the effective
functioning of the international insolvency system.”).
See generally E.U. Regulation, supra note 1.
International Bar Association, Section on Business Law, Committee J-Insolvency and Creditors’
Rights, Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat (1996), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/
Default.aspx?DocumentUid=2d55e76f-cab1-493d-b0a9-4b4b967b353f; Comm. J, Sec. on Bus. L.,
Int’l Bar Ass’n., Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (1988), reprinted in Timothy E.
Powers, The Model International Insolvency Co-operation Act: A 21st Century Proposal for International
Insolvency Co-operation, AA-1–AA-16 in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MULTINATIONAL
COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY (1993); G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (1998) [Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law].
See, for example, Garrido, supra note 25 at 472.
The E.C. Regulation was enacted with the stated goal of creating a scheme that is “binding and
directly applicable,” “[i]n order to achieve the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of
insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects.” E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 pmbl. (8).
The E.C. Regulation largely followed the Model Law’s structure and principles, with the primary
difference between the two being “the operative framework of the [E.C. Regulation]; specifically[
that] the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has authority to issue [binding rulings], which allows for
harmonization on many of the points of law—particularly determination of COMI issues—when
the domestic courts applying the [E.C. Regulation] come to inconsistent results.” Anthony V.
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To that end, the E.U. enacted the E.U. Regulation.45 The E.U. Regulation
was enacted following a 2012 report on the effectiveness of the E.C. Regulation.46
The majority of the E.U. Regulation’s provisions are set to enter into force on
June 26, 2017.47 The most significant changes included in the E.U. Regulation are
the addition of provisions dealing with coordinating multi-entity insolvencies, and
so-called “undertakings,” which allow the primary insolvency administrator to
offer informal settlements to creditors in secondary locations in order to
streamline the aggregation of the debtor’s assets in the primary insolvency
proceeding.48
Though these added provisions aim to increase the administrative efficiency
of cross-border insolvencies, they focus chiefly on streamlining the consolidation
of assets into the primary proceeding and handling multi-entity insolvency
proceedings more efficiently.49 They do not squarely address the challenges faced
by employee creditors in navigating the disparate insolvency regimes that exist
throughout the E.U.
The changes incorporated in the E.U. Regulation are largely intended to
address the proliferation of insolvencies with cross-border characteristics. As
several commentators have noted, however, the operation of insolvency law is
particularly important to one class of creditors—the employees—given their
unique position relative to the debtor.50 It is important to view the changes

45
46

47

48
49
50

Sexton, Current Problems and Trends in the Administration of Transnational Insolvencies Involving Enterprise
Groups: The Mixed Record of Protocols, the UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law, and the EU Insolvency
Regulation, 12 U. CHI. J. INT’L L. 811, 831–32 (2012).
See generally, E.U. Regulation, supra note 1.
See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social
Committee on the Application of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency
Proceedings, COM (2012) 743 final (Dec. 12, 2012).
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 92 (noting, however, that certain articles therein will have different
effective dates. These articles generally relate to the sharing of information regarding insolvencies
within Member States’ territories, and are not of particular relevance for present purposes.).
Id. arts. 36, 56–83.
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (3), (42), (51).
See, for example, WESTBROOK, supra note 26 at 184 (2010) (“There can be little doubt that the overall
effect on employees and their families is qualitatively far worse than it is on other creditors.”); Janis
Sarra, An Investigation Into Employee Wage and Pension Claims in Insolvency Proceedings Across Multiple
Jurisdictions: Preliminary Observations, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 Art. 8, 1 (2007) (“Employees are
seriously affected by firm financial failure. Wages, vacation pay, expense claims, termination, and
severance pay are frequently claims outstanding at the point of commercial insolvency . . . .
Employees face information asymmetries; hence they are often the last creditors to know of the
company’s financial distress and the least able to protect themselves in advance from the losses
associated with firm failure.”). The unique situation in which employees are placed when their
employer becomes insolvent—and their unique characteristics relative to other stakeholders in the
insolvency process—warrants the change in implementation argued for here.
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incorporated into the E.U. Regulation, and the provisions left unchanged, in light
of their effects on the claims of this especially vulnerable subset of creditors.51
The E.U. Regulation, as indicated above, seeks to streamline cross-border
insolvencies, reduce gamesmanship and forum-shopping, and improve the
efficiency of the proceedings.52 However, in allowing for the application of one
State’s laws to the vast majority of potential claims against a debtor, the claims of
foreign employees can fall through the cracks during the transition from one State
to another.53 Likewise, even under two regimes that grant a priority to employee
claims, an employee that has been partially satisfied out of the assets in their home
State is likely to not be advantaged by the priority afforded their claims in the main
insolvency proceeding, given the high variability of national insolvency regimes
and the pari passu rule contained in the E.U. Regulation.54
The reason that employee-claimants are still faced with challenges in
securing satisfaction of their claims is illustrated by Sections 66 and 72 of the
Preamble to the E.U. Regulation.55 For insolvency proceedings governed by the
E.U. Regulation, the Member State opening insolvency proceedings provides the
controlling body of law.56 In certain circumstances, the E.U. Regulation permits
challenges to the opening of a main insolvency proceeding.57 Nevertheless, absent
an upheld challenge, the opening of a main insolvency proceeding by a national
court can lock in the body of law applicable to the case, having profound effects
on the final distribution of the debtor’s assets.58
Further, though the E.U. Regulation provides for a general choice of law
rule, there are certain exceptions that permit other nations’ laws to apply, primarily
51
52
53
54

55
56

57

58

See WESTBROOK, supra note 26 at 183–86.
See note 43 supra and accompanying text. See also, for example, E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl.
(5).
WESTBROOK, supra note 26 at 192–94.
See E.U. Regulation art. 23 (Also known as the “hotch pot” rule, the pari passu rule provides that
creditors that have obtained some payment of their claim in the course of insolvency proceedings
“shall share in distributions made in other proceedings only where creditors of the same ranking . . .
have . . . obtained an equivalent dividend.”).
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (66), (72).
Id. art. 3. See also id. art. 7 (delineating the applicable body of law in particular situations, including
“the rules governing the distribution of proceeds from the realisation of assets[ and] the ranking of
claims”). The determination of the appropriate Member State to open proceedings is provided for
generally in Article 3 of the E.U. Regulation. Id. art. 3.
Id. arts. 3–5. To wit, the debtor or a creditor may challenge the opening based on a lack of
international jurisdiction as defined in Article 3 of the E.U. Regulation, or on other grounds if
provided for by national law Id. Third parties may also challenge the opening “where national law
so provides.” Id. art. 5(2).
See notes 3 & 4, supra and accompanying text. It is also useful to note that courts presented with a
request to open insolvency proceedings are to examine sua sponte whether jurisdiction under Article
3 of the E.U. Regulation does in fact exist so as to make opening the proceedings proper thereunder.
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 4.

Summer 2016

133

Chicago Journal of International Law

to components of the insolvency case considered uniquely national, and thus
properly governed by the law applicable from the origination of the right,
including, for example, rights in rem and contracts relating to immovable
property.59 Contracts of employment are likewise governed by the law applicable
to the contract, even if it is not the law of the State opening the main insolvency
proceeding.60 However, employee claims brought under these contracts are still
governed by the law of the primary insolvency proceeding State, even if the
employment contract was governed by a different body of law.61 This means that,
for any given employee in any given E.U. Member State, the law by which their
claims for past due wages, pension payments, paid leave, or other such payments
is governed could be vastly different than another employee identically-situated
save for their employer’s headquarters.62
a) Consistencies between the E.C. and E.U. Regulations. When analyzing the E.U.
Regulation’s effect on employee claims, it is first useful to take note of the relevant
provisions of the E.C. Regulation that have carried over in more or less the same
form to the E.U. Regulation, as these key provisions set the stage for the
implementation problems that bear heavily on employee claims in the insolvency
administration process.63
Section 63 of the E.U. Regulation’s Preamble, corresponding with Section
21 of the E.C. Regulation’s Preamble, provides that
[a]ny creditor which has its habitual residence, domicile or registered office in
the Union should have the right to lodge its claims in each of the insolvency
proceedings pending in the Union relating to the debtor’s assets . . . Every
creditor should be able to keep what it has received in the course of
insolvency proceedings, but should be entitled only to participate in the
distribution of total assets in other proceedings if creditors with the same
standing have obtained the same proportion of their claims.64

This language as implemented in the operative provisions of the E.U.
Regulation, makes clear that creditors may assert their claims against the debtor in
any other proceeding the debtor is subject to, but they take of those distributions
only insofar as other creditors of the same “ranking or category” have already
reached the same proportion of satisfaction of their claims (the so-called pari
passu or “hotch pot rule”).65

59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. arts. 8, 11.
Id. pmbl. (72), art. 13.
Id. pmbl. (72), arts. 7, 13.
This flows directly from the choice of law provision of Article 9 of the E.U. Regulation.
Cf. E.U. Regulation supra note 1 at Annex D (noting the correlation between the provisions of the
E.U. Regulation and the EC Regulation).
Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (63), with E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 pmbl. (21).
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 23, 45, 53–55.
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The E.U. Regulation likewise contains the same language as the E.C.
Regulation regarding the choice of law rules to be applied.66 The choice of law
articles of each Regulation are substantively identical, and both provide that the
law of the jurisdiction opening proceedings shall be “the law applicable to
insolvency proceedings and their effects.”67 Of particular relevance here, both
Regulations provide that the law of the opening jurisdiction shall provide “the
rules governing the distribution of proceeds from the realization of assets, the
ranking of claims and the rights of creditors who have obtained partial satisfaction
after the opening of insolvency proceedings by virtue of a right in rem or through
a set-off.”68
Another holdover from the E.C. Regulation is the treatment of employee
claims in the explicit terms of the Regulations, adding further context to the
Regulations’ choice of law provisions.69 Contracts of employment are excluded
from the choice of law provision that consolidates the law governing the
insolvency proceedings in most other circumstances.70 Thus, employment
contracts are governed by the body of law that would govern them outside of
insolvency “in accordance with the general rules on conflict of laws.”71 Both
Regulations, however, provide that “[a]ny other questions relating to the law of
insolvency, such as whether the employees’ claims are protected by preferential
rights and the status such preferential rights may have, should be determined by
the law of the Member State in which the insolvency proceedings (main or
secondary) have been opened.”72
b) New additions to the E.U. Regulation. The E.U. Regulation also incorporates
several notable departures from the E.C. Regulation’s language.73 One major
update is the inclusion of Chapter V.74 Chapter V addresses the unique issues
posed by multi-entity insolvencies, in particular making detailed provision for
communication and cooperation between the courts administering the various
interrelated proceedings.75 Chapter V Section 2 in particular sets out the
procedures for the institution of group coordination proceedings, and the duties
of the coordinator appointed to harmonize the operations of the various
proceedings.76 Specific provision is made for several “tasks and rights” to vest in
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (66), with E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 pmbl. (23)
Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7(1), with E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 art. 4(1).
Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7(2)(i), with E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 art. 4(2)(i).
Compare E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 art. 4, with E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7.
Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (72), with E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 pmbl. (28).
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (72), art. 13(1).
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (72). See also E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 pmbl. (28).
See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 at Annex D.
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 56–77.
Id.
Id. arts. 61–77.
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the coordinator, including the right to be heard and participate in any of the
proceedings opened in respect to any member of the enterprise group, and the
task of “propos[ing] a group coordination plan that identifies, describes and
recommends a comprehensive set of measures appropriate to an integrated
approach to the resolution of the group members’ insolvencies.”77
The next major change incorporated into the E.U. Regulation is the
“undertaking” framework of Article 36.78 The main insolvency administrator, in
order to streamline the insolvency process, is allowed a means by which to attempt
to prevent the institution of secondary proceedings.79 The main insolvency
administrator can enter into an agreement with the creditors likely to institute
secondary proceedings that, when distributing the assets from the secondary
location, the primary insolvency administrator will comply with the “distribution
and priority rights under national law that creditors would have if secondary
insolvency proceedings were opened in that Member State.”80
Another innovation found in the E.U. Regulation is the expansion of
cooperation and coordination provisions between insolvency administrators and
courts in the various jurisdictions in which the debtor has assets.81 Combined with
Chapter IV’s information disclosure provisions, this evidences an interest in
increasing the opportunities and abilities of the various stakeholders in the
insolvency administration to coordinate the insolvency proceedings as efficiently
as possible.82 The E.C. Regulation had somewhat similar language, most notably
the provision for the right of “any creditor who has his habitual residence,
domicile, or registered office in a Member State” to lodge a claim in any insolvency
proceeding governed by the Regulations.83 However, the E.U. Regulation’s
Chapter IV provides a more expansive allowance for the right to bring claims,
extending the right to “[a]ny foreign creditor.”84 Chapter IV further provides for
a standardized form and language accommodations that purport to make it easier
for foreign claimants to lodge their claims in other insolvency proceedings.85

2. Primary approaches to employee protection.
Though most E.U. Member States afford special protection to employees in
insolvency proceedings, the precise methods and procedures can differ widely

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. art. 72.
Id. art. 36.
Id.
Id. art. 36.
Id. arts. 41–44.
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 53–55.
Compare E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 art. 39, with E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 53.
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 53.
See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 54(3), 55(1).
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from State to State.86 In the international community generally, there are three
major approaches to handling the claims of employees of the debtor firm currently
in use. First, some States afford employee claims some manner of priority in the
insolvency distribution process.87 As one commentator noted, “The underlying
policy rationale . . . is frequently that employees are considered particularly
vulnerable claimants and a statutory priority offers them some limited relief from
losses incurred due to their employer’s insolvency.”88 The second major approach
is to provide for guarantee funds or insurance schemes, which operate to at least
partially insulate employees from the full brunt of the employer’s insolvency and
the detrimental effects it can have on their income.89 The rationale here, as one
commentator notes, “is that such funds guarantee payments to workers when they
are most vulnerable and can be far more expeditious than recovery after a
bankrupt estate has been liquidated and payments made to creditors.”90 The last
major approach is an amalgamation of both approaches. Under the hybrid
approaches, some form of creditor priority is combined with some form of
guarantee or insurance fund, often with a resulting subrogation of the guarantee
fund to the employee’s claim in the insolvency proceeding.91 The rationale behind
the hybrid approach is that “both strategies are needed to protect employees and
to create the appropriate incentives for director and officer conduct in the period
leading up to the business enterprise entering insolvency proceedings.”92
In one of the few, and most extensive, studies on the subject, Professor Sarra
observed that, of the sixty-two States surveyed, the most common schemes were
the hybrid system and the preference system, with the hybrid system being
employed by twenty-nine of the States surveyed, and the preference system in use
by twenty-six States.93 In contrast, the pure guarantee fund approach, without
some form of preference in liquidation, was employed by only five States.94
Within these broad categories, States can differ widely in the precise
approach taken. For example, as between States in the priority-granting category,
the exact ordering of the priority and the types and amounts of the priority can
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

See generally Janis Sarra, An Investigation into Employee Wage and Pension Claims in Insolvency Proceedings
Across Multiple Jurisdictions: Preliminary Observations, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 Art. 8 (2007).
SARRA STUDY, supra note 4 at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
SARRA STUDY, supra note 4 at 10–11 & graph 1.
Id. Of particular interest here, Austria and Germany are among the minority of Member States that
have a purely guarantee fund protection scheme, though, as with all comparisons that can be drawn,
even within this relatively small subset of the survey, the precise details of the States’ approaches
vary. Id. at 35–41.
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differ to a large extent.95 Likewise, between States with some form of guarantee
fund, the exact types of employee claims, the caps imposed on guarantee
payments, and other such variables can differ between States.96
Another means by which States can differ is in how they fund their guarantee
funds.97 There are two major approaches to funding the guarantee funds: (1)
general taxation, spreading the costs throughout the national economy as a whole,
and (2) a levy on the business that operate in the State, including, in numerous
cases, apportioning the necessary levies “based on the risks inherent in the
particular sector or industry.”98

C. A More Direct Approach to Employee Protection: The
Guarantee Mandate
On October 22, 2008, the E.U. enacted the Guarantee Mandate.99 The
Guarantee Mandate requires Member States to provide guarantee funds that
ensure a minimum level of protection for employees in the event that their
employer becomes insolvent.100 The Guarantee Mandate permits Member States
to set higher levels of protections and to establish (or maintain) a priority for
employee claims in addition to guarantee funds.101 Indeed, the European Court of
Justice, albeit operating under the original 1980 Directive, has indicated that
Member States are liable for the guarantee of employee claims even if they have
not transposed the Directive into their national laws.102 Thus, the Guarantee
Mandate has had the effect of requiring all Member States to have either a “pure
guarantee” regime or a “hybrid” guarantee/priority regime for protecting

95

96

97
98
99
100
101

102

Id. at 18 (noting that “one can construct a matrix of the types of priorities or preferences for wage
and related claims,” and that such a matrix would include categories like an absolute priority even
over secured creditors, priority alongside administrative costs, priority only over unsecured
creditors, and even priority divided up by the time frame over which the claims were alleged to have
accrued).
Id. at 34 (noting that a variety of approaches to the guarantee fund are employed, including varying
levels of monetary caps (a number of times corresponding “in some measure to the amount of
priority granted such claims,”) and imposing timeframe limits on how far back claims would be
guaranteed).
Id. at 34, 35.
Id.
See generally Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7.
See id. arts. 3, 4.
See id. art. 11. See also Paul M. Secunda, An Analysis of the Treatment of Employee Pension and Wage Claims
in Insolvency and Under Guarantee Schemes in OECD Countries: Comparative Law Lessons for Detroit and the
United States, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 867, 903 (2014) (“This directive sets a minimum standard in
all E.U. countries . . . but it does not prevent higher protection for employee claims in these
situations.”).
See Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. I-5403 ¶¶ 15, 46.
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employee claims, as the “pure priority” regime is no longer permitted under the
Guarantee Mandate.103
Article 3 of the Guarantee Mandate provides that “Member States shall take
measures necessary to ensure that guarantee institutions guarantee, subject to
Article 4, payment of employees’ outstanding claims resulting from contracts of
employment . . . including, where provided for by national law, severance pay on
termination of employment relationships.”104 Article 4 allows Member States to
limit the extent to which the guarantee fund insures employee claims either by
time period or amount ceilings.105 However, any time period is required to be
accompanied by a particular reference period depending on the timeframe limit
imposed, and any amount ceiling “must not fall below a level which is socially
compatible with the social objective of [the] Directive.”106
The Guarantee Mandate further provides that the two main methods of
funding guarantee funds—a tax on the whole economy or a levy on the firms
doing business in the Member States—are permissible options for Member
States.107 The Guarantee Mandate further provides, however, that “the assets of
the institutions must be independent of the employers’ operating capital and be
inaccessible to proceedings for insolvency . . . [and] the institutions’ liabilities must
not depend on whether or not obligations to contribute to financing have been
fulfilled.”108
The Guarantee Mandate also contains specific provisions for cross-border
insolvencies.109 Article 9 provides that the guarantee fund responsible for paying
employee claims is that “in the Member State in whose territory they work or
habitually work,” and further that “[t]he extent of employees’ rights shall be
determined by the law governing the competent guarantee institution.”110
At bottom, then, the Guarantee Mandate requires Member States to provide
for a minimal level of protection for employee wage claims.111 The amount and
method of calculation of the payments to which employees are entitled are
governed by the law of the State in which the employee works, and the employees
are protected from a reduction in payments if the funds have not been fully
103

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

See generally Guarantee Mandate supra note 7. Indeed, under the European Court of Justice’s
precedent, it appears that if Member States are unwilling to implement the Guarantee Mandate,
employees and the courts could constructively force them to anyway by holding the Member States
liable for the amount of the guarantee payment.
Id. art. 3.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 4(3).
Guarantee Mandate supra note 7 art. 5.
Id.
Id. art. 9.
Id.
Id. pmbl. (3), art. 4.
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implemented or financed.112 However, the Guarantee Mandate still allows
Member States a significant amount of latitude to customize their
implementations of the Mandate, including the precise amounts and time periods
of payments to guarantee and the method of funding the guarantee fund.113
Though a significant step forward in ensuring the protection of employee
claims in insolvency—and, indeed, a clear codification of the gravity with which
the E.U. views the plight of the employee in cross-border insolvencies—the
interaction with the E.U. Regulation’s choice of law provisions can nevertheless
lead to disparate outcomes for employee claims in cases involving one or more
Member States, especially in cases involving fundamentally different approaches
to structuring insolvency regimes, but even in cases with differences so slight as
differing approaches to priority regimes.114

D. Constructing the Framework
Because of the unique positioning of employees in cross-border insolvencies
and the emphasis that E.U. law places upon employee protection, the situation of
interest here is the following: what happens when a firm is headquartered in a
particular E.U. Member State, but conducts business operations in a number of
other E.U. Member States before becoming insolvent? If an employee works for
the debtor firm in one State, but the assets in that State are insufficient to satisfy
the employee’s claims, the employee can lodge a claim for the balance in the State
where the primary insolvency proceeding is being conducted.115 However, the
precise approaches to protecting employee claims differ widely from State to
State.116 For example, if a French employee of a German company has to lodge a
residual wage claim in the primary insolvency proceeding, their claim will receive
no priority under the German insolvency regime.117 However, their next door
neighbor, a French employee of a French company, identical in every way but for
the nationality of their employer, would receive a priority for their residual wage
claim in the primary insolvency proceeding.118 Thus, even though E.U. Member
States have the option to customize their national insolvency regimes according
to their view of the appropriate level of protection to afford to employee claims,
the structure of the E.U.-wide law in this area means that a subset of the prioritygranting State’s workforce (those employees working for foreign corporations
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. arts. 3–5.
Id. arts. 4–5.
See, generally, SARRA STUDY, supra note 4.
See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 45 (“Any creditor may lodge its claim in the main insolvency
proceedings and in any secondary insolvency proceedings.”).
SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 9–10.
Id. at 237–38, 249–50.
Id. at 237–38.
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headquartered in non-priority-granting States) is not receiving the level of
protection that State has determined is necessary. Moreover, the determinant of
this disparate outcome is simply where the employer is headquartered.119

1. The detrimental interaction between the E.U. Regulation and the
Guarantee Mandate.
In order to develop a solution to this disparate treatment, it is important to
ask precisely what provisions of the E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee Mandate
operate to this effect.
The Guarantee Mandate allows Member States to determine how strongly
to protect employees of insolvent companies.120 It also permits them to determine
the particular types of claims, time periods, and monetary amounts of claims to
guarantee.121 Though allowing for an important outlet for Member States’ national
policy choices regarding the proper amount of protection for employee claims,
the Guarantee Mandate nevertheless imports national law into the E.U.-wide
insolvency regime in a way that effectively creates another exception to the choice
of law provisions of the E.U. Regulation.122 The choice of law rule, then, strips
priority regimes from priority-granting States, and applies the priority where it is
not recognized at domestic law. The pari passu rule further interferes with the
recoveries employees realize.123

2. Concluding thoughts on the current state of the E.U.
insolvency regime.
Neither the E.U. Regulation nor the Guarantee Mandate alone can address
the problems created by the interaction between the two enactments. As such, it
is useful to draw some conclusions about the current state of affairs before
proceeding to consider the solution advanced here.
First, the E.U. Regulation’s provision for undertakings will not affect cases
in which there are sufficient assets located in the secondary jurisdiction to satisfy

119

120
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123

This outcome obtains because the choice of law provisions in the E.U. Regulation, Article 7 are
activated by the jurisdictional provisions of Article 3, which establishes that the debtor’s COMI is
determinative of the proper location for the institution of primary insolvency proceedings. E.U.
Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 3, 7.
Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7 arts. 2(4), 11.
Id. arts. 3–8.
In a world in which the law of the jurisdiction opening the main insolvency proceeding governs
(with the exceptions created by the E.U. Regulation), providing for a guarantee fund governed by
the law of the Member State in which the employee works creates sub silentio a new exception to the
E.U. Regulation as to the amount guaranteed by the guarantee fund and as to those employees
whose claims are partially satisfied thereby.
See E.U. Regulation supra note 1 art. 23.
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all claims in that jurisdiction.124 Allowing for a more streamlined distribution of
assets located in the secondary jurisdiction benefits the insolvency proceeding as
a whole, and to the extent that it leads to a faster satisfaction of employee claims,
it is a useful tool for that purpose.125 However, where the secondary jurisdiction
does not contain enough assets to satisfy all claims, the secondary jurisdiction’s
claimants must lodge their claims in the primary insolvency proceeding, thereby
inviting the disparate outcomes discussed here.126
Second, the E.U. Regulation’s provision for cross-jurisdictional cooperation
between insolvency practitioners and courts could be useful in providing more
equitable treatment to the employee claims in the several insolvency
proceedings.127 To the extent the various courts and insolvency practitioners can
conclude inter-jurisdictional agreements dealing with the administration of the
insolvency proceedings, the E.U. Regulation may resolve disparities in treatment
of employee claims between local employees and foreign employees. However, to
the extent transaction costs or other barriers to negotiation leave employee claims
out of the E.U. Regulation’s coordination provisions, that such forms of
coordination are permitted will not produce any beneficial change in the status
and treatment of employee claims.
Third, providing special procedures for administering multi-entity crossborder insolvencies is not likely to benefit employees in any significant way.128 The
only real benefits that employees might realize out of these changes to the E.U.
Regulation are the marginal benefits that all claimants (and the debtor) will realize
from having an insolvency proceeding that is administered more efficiently, at a
lower cost, more expediently, or any combination of the three. Though the
efficiency gains might have real, tangible benefits for all parties to the insolvency,
they do not squarely address the problems that uniquely and disproportionately
affect employee claimants, and cannot, in any event, eliminate the disparate effect
of the E.U. Regulation’s interaction with the Guarantee Mandate.129

124

125

126
127
128
129

Where assets in the secondary jurisdiction are sufficient to satisfy the claims in that jurisdiction, the
law of the primary jurisdiction will not come into play as to those claims in that jurisdiction.
Following the conclusion of the distribution in the secondary jurisdiction, whether by secondary
proceeding or by undertaking, the assets can get folded into the main insolvency proceeding. Id.
arts. 41, 49. This situation is outside the scope of this Comment.
The whole point of the inclusion of the undertaking language was to increase the efficiency of the
insolvency administration, so to the extent it accomplishes its stated goal, the benefits definitionally
accrue to all those with a stake in the conclusion of the insolvency proceedings by virtue of the
faster satisfaction of claims in secondary jurisdictions, and the minimization of delays in the primary
insolvency proceedings.
See E.U. Regulation supra note 1 art. 45.
See id. arts. 41, 42.
Id. arts. 56–77.
Cf. id.
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To be sure, the Guarantee Mandate’s requirement that Member States satisfy
certain minimum levels of employee claims for employees working in their
territory likely makes employees better off than they would be in situations
without such a guarantee fund. This is true both because of the guarantee of a
certain minimum level of satisfaction of their claims and because of the
expediency of the payment.130 Nevertheless, the Guarantee Mandate does not
displace the E.U. Regulation’s choice of law provisions regarding employee claims
in insolvency proceedings.131 As such, the Guarantee Mandate has the effect of
making employees in priority-granting States worse off if they work for a foreign
company headquartered in a State that grants no priority than if they worked for
a domestic company.132
Indeed, the component of the current legal regime that will arguably be most
useful to employees in cross-border insolvencies is the change that is the least
ambitious. Information asymmetry is a significant barrier to employee-claimants
lodging claims in other insolvency proceedings in which the debtor’s assets are
distributed.133 By providing greater information in a more useful, usable, and
standardized form, the E.U. Regulation’s expanded information disclosure and
notification provisions may operate to reduce the information asymmetry under
which employee claimants often labor, if not prior to their employer entering
insolvency, then at least during the insolvency proceedings.134 If employeeclaimants are better informed of their rights under E.U. law and the existence of
insolvency proceedings in other Member States, they are better placed to assert
their rights in the proper forum.
As shown here, the changes incorporated into the E.U. Regulation, though
likely to provide gains to the efficiency of insolvency administrations as a whole,
will not address the disparate treatment employee-claimants face when they seek
to have their claims satisfied in a jurisdiction with different priority schemes for
employee claims.135 As such, a change in the way Member States discharge their
obligations under the current legal regime is necessary to eliminate the conflict
between the E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee Mandate’s incorporation of

130
131
132

133

134
135

See, generally, Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7.
Cf., generally, id. See, also, E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7.
The dynamic nature of the choice of law provisions of the E.U. Regulation, coupled with the static
provision and implementation of the Guarantee Mandate has the effect of failing to account for the
loss of priority in this subset of cross-border cases. Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7, with
Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7 art. 9.
SARRA STUDY supra note 4, at 4 (Employees “are often the last creditors to know of the company’s
financial distress and the least able to protect themselves in advance from the losses associated with
firm failure.”).
See id.
See supra Section II(B)(1)(b).
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different bodies of law that produces unintended consequences for the very class
of claimants these regulations were meant to protect.

III. A DVANCING THE S OLUTION
As noted above, the cornerstone of the entire Regulation, the lex fori
provision, directly imports the vast majority of a State’s insolvency law into the
Regulation’s framework.136 As a result, the law governing the distribution of the
debtor’s assets, in most situations and as to most claims, will be that of the State
administering the main insolvency proceedings.137 With the incorporation of
Article 36’s “undertakings” provision, the number of cases in which secondary
proceedings are instituted will likely drop since an undertaking can accomplish the
same result more efficiently and at lower cost.138
The high degree of variability among E.U. Member States’ insolvency
regimes can lead to perverse outcomes when the primary insolvency proceeding
is incorporating the claims of foreign employees into a trans-national system that
relies as heavily upon national law as does the E.U. Regulation. For employees
going from insolvency proceedings in a priority regime to insolvency proceedings
in a guarantee regime, lodging the balance of their claims in the guarantee regime
proceeding can be all but futile by virtue of the pari passu rule and lack of priority
afforded in those proceedings.139
The solution, then, is to adjust the operation of national law in this context
in order to eliminate the respective inconsistencies. Rather than have an
employee’s claim be governed by multiple different bodies of law, the
inconsistency (and thus the disparate treatment of similarly-situated employees)
can be eliminated by changing the way Member States implement the Guarantee
Mandate. Paying employees’ claims as if national law applied to their claim, rather
than making a fixed payment and leaving the balance to be lodged in the main
insolvency proceeding, will minimize the detrimental effects of the changing legal
regime upon the employee-claimants.140

A. The Proposed Adjustment From the Employee’s
Perspective
The efficient and equitable outcome is to provide for payment of employee
claims in two stages: first, at the outset of the debtor’s insolvency, at the minimum
level provided by the Guarantee Mandate. This ensures the goals of the Guarantee
Mandate are not abrogated in the hunt for precision in determining the proper
136
137
138
139
140

See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7.
See id. art. 3.
See id. art. 36.
Cf. id. art. 23.
Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7 art. 9.

144

Vol. 17 No. 1

Unintended Consequences

Eastby

amounts of claims. The second payment should take place after the primary
insolvency proceedings have had sufficient time to ascertain the scope of the
debtor’s affairs. Given the E.U. Regulation’s provision for expanded information
sharing and coordination among jurisdictions, the proposed change in
implementation is a simple matter for the guarantee fund or other competent
authority in the secondary jurisdiction to accomplish.141 They will be able to access
the available information on the debtor, ascertain the extent of the debtor’s assets,
and determine what the distribution would be if the entirety of the debtor’s assets
were governed by the secondary jurisdiction’s laws, as opposed to the primary
jurisdiction.142 Upon making this determination, employees would receive the
second payment, representing the difference between the amount of the first
payment and the amount it is determined the employee would have received had
the domestic law applied to all of the assets.143 States’ guarantee funds do not need
to wait until the conclusion of the primary insolvency proceedings to make the
second payment, or even to determine the appropriate value of the second
payment, as the information sufficient to make the simulated distribution
determination is available prior to the confirmation of insolvency plans.144
The result of the dynamic approach argued for here is not a regime in which
foreign employee claims are never brought in primary insolvency proceedings.
The operation of this dynamic approach would have the guarantee fund pay the
amount the employee could have received in a domestic insolvency proceeding,
which still very likely would not equal the full value of the claim the employee has
against the debtor. The difference, however, is the employee is not deciding
whether to lodge a claim in the primary insolvency proceeding or to accept only
the bare minimum guaranteed by the Guarantee Mandate. The employee instead
is deciding whether or not to lodge that claim and go to the expense of seeing the
primary insolvency proceeding through to the end. It may very well be that more
employees decide that taking what they could have received in a domestic
proceeding is better than going to the extra expense of raising the claims in foreign
courts.

B. The
Proposed
Adjustment
Fund’s Perspective

from

the

Guarantee

The dynamic approach to satisfying employee claims would have
justifications and effects in two chronological segments: (1) before the insolvency
and guarantee fund payment, and (2) after the guarantee fund payment is made.
141
142
143

144

E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 41–45, 53–55.
Id.
See Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7 art. 4. The Guarantee Mandate does not set out a minimum
required amount of the guarantee fund payments, but rather provides that the limits “must not fall
below a level which is socially compatible with the social objective of this Directive.” Id.
Cf. E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 53–55.
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1. Ex post: during the insolvency proceeding.
Operating in tandem with the two stage payment of employee claims is the
guarantee fund’s role in the primary insolvency proceeding. Upon paying
employee claims, the guarantee funds become subrogated to those claims against
the debtor, thus acquiring the right to pursue those claims against the debtor to
recoup the costs of paying the employees in the first place.145 In this context, the
claims the guarantee fund can bring against the debtor correlate evenly with the
payments made to the employees: absent the guarantee fund, the total amount of
claims against the debtor are not increasing or decreasing. Thus, for a debtor that
employed 100 employees in a given State, that State’s guarantee fund could
represent the claims of all 100 in the main insolvency proceeding following its
payment of those employees’ claims. For a debtor that owed one employee in a
given State $100 in back wages, that State’s guarantee fund would have a $100
claim against the debtor. Likewise, if the guarantee fund in the latter example paid
only $50 to the employee, the guarantee fund would have a $50 claim, and the
employee would have her residual $50 claim, for a total amount claimed against
the debtor of $100.
It will be noted, and correctly so, that a regime in which a guarantee fund
raises the entirety, or even a significant portion, of an employee’s claim in the main
insolvency proceeding is a regime in which the guarantee fund is not likely to
receive full satisfaction on that claim. The mere fact that the debtor is insolvent
will tell even the most casual observer, however, that insolvent firms do not have
enough assets to satisfy all of their obligations.
The important question to ask, instead, is how this situation compares to the
alternative. Under the approach advanced here, the employee is paid the amount
they would have received under a domestic insolvency proceeding. This change
necessarily means that the guarantee fund accepts the difference between what the
employee would receive in a domestic proceeding and what an employee would
receive in the primary insolvency proceeding as a loss on that particular
“transaction.” This loss gets passed on to the funders of the guarantee fund in the
form of higher required contributions.146
The status quo alternative to this application of the Guarantee Mandate is
that the employee is paid whatever fixed amount the Member State sets, and the
employee raises the balance of the claim in the primary insolvency proceeding. 147
145
146

147

See SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 32, 43–44.
Given that the fund is government operated and its sole business is paying employee claims arising
out of insolvency, it definitionally falls to the funders of the guarantee fund, be they taxpayers or
firms, to absorb any losses occasioned by payments to employees that are higher than the
distributions received on account of the subrogated claims. Cf. SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 34–
35.
See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 45.
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The guarantee fund likewise raises a claim in the primary insolvency proceeding
for the amount of the subrogated claim.148 Under the static approach currently
employed, the only risk to the guarantee fund is that it receives less from the
insolvency proceeding than the bare minimum payment level required by the
Guarantee Fund.
As this comparison indicates, the difference between the current legal regime
and the one argued for here is that the guarantee fund assumes a higher risk of
loss from a lack of assets to go around in the insolvency proceeding. This
argument’s motivating fact, however, is that this risk of loss is not created out of
thin air. It is assumed from the employees that bear it under the current state of
the law. To be clear, the risk of insufficient assets existing to satisfy employee
claims is currently borne by the employees themselves. Under the dynamic
approach, the guarantee firm bears a greater segment of this risk, and is thus able
to allocate that risk as a national policy choice. Put another way, the Guarantee
Mandate and the E.U. Regulation, because of an imperfect harmonization in their
provisions governing which bodies of law apply in certain cases, pass a great deal
of the risk of insolvency onto employees in certain cases (those with cross-border
implications), but not in other cases (those governed by purely domestic law).

2. Ex ante: funding the guarantee fund.
The means by which the guarantee fund compensates for the increased
expected losses it would assume under the approach argued for here is precisely
the same as the means by which it gathers funds currently. The guarantee fund
will either gather funds from the tax base at large, spreading the risks of business
insolvency across the national economy as a whole, or from levies on the business
that operate in the State, spreading the risks among the firms that bear some
likelihood of creating the problem the Guarantee Mandate seeks to prevent in the
first place. This latter method of funding also permits the guarantee funds to
allocate risk according to perceptions of the riskiness of the business endeavors,
levying higher assessments against those firms that are perceived to be more likely
to enter insolvency in the first place, thereby more fully tailoring the costs of the
insolvency protections to those more likely to create them.149

C. Concluding Thou ghts on the Proposed Adjustment
The current state of the legal regime governing E.U. cross-border
insolvencies places a large portion of the risk of loss arising out of insolvency on
148
149

See SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 32, 43–44; E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 45.
SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 34–35 (“In numerous jurisdictions, the guarantee fund is sector- or
industry-funded, with premiums paid by corporations and other business enterprises, based on the
risks inherent in the particular sector or industry.”).
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employees. Espousing a general principle that employee claims are worthy of
special protections in the insolvency process, the Guarantee Mandate has set a
minimum level at which employee claims must be satisfied.150 However, when
switching between multiple applicable bodies of law, the Guarantee Mandate and
E.U. Regulation do not require Member States and their guarantee funds to
internalize the risk inherent in switching from a legal regime in which an employee
claim is afforded a priority (and thus under which employees would presumably
recover more) to a legal regime in which employee claims do not receive a priority
(and thus are expected to recover less, up to and including nothing).151 Instead,
the employee-claimants that must bring their claims in the primary insolvency
proceeding bear the majority of the risk that the change in applicable law will
render their claim there moot.152 In addition to causing the employees’ expected
losses from the insolvency of their employer to be higher than if the insolvency
were governed purely by domestic law, which necessarily means that the
employees are receiving disparate treatment relative to an identically-situated
employee of a domestic firm, the Member States’ policy judgment that employee
claims deserve the protection of both a guarantee fund and a priority in the
insolvency proceedings is being frustrated.
Because of this counter-intuitive and idiosyncratic treatment of a subset of
creditors widely recognized to be especially vulnerable in insolvency proceedings,
a new approach is warranted. It is argued that an approach to implementing
Member States’ obligations under the Guarantee Mandate, under which the
guarantee funds pay employee claims as they would have been paid under a purely
domestic insolvency proceeding, rectifies the disparate treatment employee claims
are currently receiving. In addition, this change to the Guarantee Mandate would
have secondary benefits that accrue not just to employees but also to the other
stakeholders in the debtor’s estate and gains to efficiency overall.

IV. I MPLICATIONS OF A C HANGED I MPLEMENTATION OF THE
G UARANTEE M ANDATE
There are four major implications that flow from changing the way Member
States implement the Guarantee Mandate: (1) employee claims are satisfied more
quickly and uniformly; (2) Member States will better internalize the costs of their
policy choices; (3) several gains to efficiency will result; and (4) Member States will
have incentives to shift towards more harmonized insolvency regimes.
150
151
152

Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7 pmbl. 3.
See, generally, id.; E.U. Regulation, supra note 1.
The employees still are not bearing the full measure of the risk, given that the guarantee fund will
be subrogated to some small part of the employees’ claim. Thus, in the situation where the employee
is expected to receive nothing from the insolvency proceeding, it is equally the case that the
guarantee fund would likewise receive nothing.
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A. Employee Claim Satisfaction
As mentioned previously, the front-loaded implementation of the claim
payment regime would have the effect of satisfying employee claims sooner than
the current legal regime. As well, because the new method of implementation
would result in the application of the law generally applicable to the employee
outside of insolvency, the change in applicable law in insolvency contemplated by
the E.U. Regulation will not result in structural discrimination against the claims
of employees of a foreign firm. Rather, the employees’ rational expectation of
equal treatment with otherwise identically situated employees will be vindicated
by a regime that pays claims according to how they would be paid at domestic law,
rather than applying a fragmented patchwork of two different bodies of law.

B. Member States’ Internalization of the Costs of the Chosen
Employee Protection Scheme
Under a regime that places greater costs upon the guarantee funds, the
necessity for recouping those expected costs is correspondingly higher, and will
fall to either the taxpayers writ large or the firms operating within the Member
State.153 This is yet another avenue for national policy preferences to express
themselves in the international legal regime. From the outset the Member States
make a policy determination as to the proper way to spread the risks that
insolvency creates for vulnerable creditors. The new legal rule would merely allow
Member States to more accurately assess those risks and spread them around
according to their relative judgment as to the appropriate distribution of risks.
The Member States place certain amounts of risk on the employees by
limiting the value, timeframe, and types of claims that the guarantee funds will
make. The current legal regime creates an unbounded outlet for the balance of the
risk, however, by not compensating for the lack of priority that employeeclaimants will receive in primary insolvency proceedings. The approach argued for
here better accounts for this risk by requiring Member States to capture it,
internalize it, and then distribute it throughout the various relevant stakeholders
as it deems fit.

C. Gains to Efficiency in the Administration of Cross-Border
Insolvency Proceedings
In addition to the benefits that this change in implementation would
produce, this change in approach would produce efficiency gains for E.U. courts
administering cross-border insolvencies. These gains would manifest themselves
primarily in two ways.
153

See SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 34–35.
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1. Increased efficiency caused by the subrogation of employee claims
to the Member States’ guarantee funds.
First, where guarantee funds pay employee claims according to domestic law,
the logical conclusion is that employees’ claims will become aggregated in the
guarantee funds. The guarantee funds can then represent all of the aggregated
claims at once. As a result, where an insolvency proceeding could become clogged
with a large number of employees all vying to be heard in the court of the main
insolvency proceeding, the competent insolvency administrator would instead be
dealing primarily with a sophisticated repeat player that can represent the
aggregated employee claims to the extent it has already paid them. This can further
the E.U. Regulation’s stated goal of streamlining insolvency administrations
independent of the necessity to pay employee claims, given that they have already
been satisfied in large part in the first instance by the guarantee fund.154

2. The Member States’ guarantee funds, not foreign courts, can apply
domestic law.
Under the regime argued for here, the E.U. Regulation’s information sharing
protocols permit domestic entities, be they courts or the guarantee funds
themselves, to determine the appropriate amount of payments to employees in
insolvency proceedings. Where the main insolvency proceeding is currently
required to parse national law to the extent it is imported into the legal regime,
this task can be passed off in large part to the guarantee funds of the Member
State in which the claims originated. In addition to the fact that this change allows
for a disaggregation of the legal questions the court in the main insolvency
proceeding decides, a domestic entity deciding domestic law reduces the
likelihood of errors, and the magnitude of the costs of those errors. Likewise, the
repeat player status of the guarantee funds allows insolvency proceedings to take
advantage of legal specialization by domestic entities in divining and applying their
own bodies of law, further increasing the efficiency of the proceedings as a whole.

D. This Change in Implementation of the Guarantee Mandate
Can Affect the Incentives of Member States in Selecting
National Legal Regimes
The natural corollary to the acknowledgement that this change allows
Member States to more fully internalize the costs of their policy choices is that
this might induce a change in national policy by the Member States. The logical
effect of changing from a regime in which a claim is governed by no priority to
one in which it is governed by a priority is that the claim is more likely to be
satisfied more fully than before. If guarantee funds are now paying out more
154

See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (3).
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claims at higher rates than before, it might be the case that Member States, rather
than increase the taxes on either businesses or the citizens, change their
behavior.155 In such a case, the natural shift would be away from the use of a
priority in insolvency distributions and toward a “pure” guarantee regime. It is not
definitionally inefficient for parties to maintain a “hybrid” regime after the passage
of the Guarantee Mandate. However, given that the Guarantee Mandate requires
guarantee funds, to the extent that the “hybrid” regime requires additional
procedures to harmonize it with the E.U. Regulation’s choice of law rules and the
various legal regimes of the Member States, a legal rule that shifts Member States
away from “hybrid” regimes and towards “pure” guarantee regimes might tend to
increase the efficiency of the E.U.-wide insolvency regime as a whole.156

V. C ONCLUSION
When cross-border insolvencies bring together two separate bodies of law,
each authoritative in its sphere, and each with fundamentally different approaches
to protecting employees during the insolvency process, the unintended
consequence is that employees are not provided with the same protections as
similarly situated employees of domestic firms.
In considering this issue, it is clear that the E.U. Regulation makes
improvements over the E.C. Regulation in several areas of relevance to the issue
of employee claims. The increased requirements for information disclosure are
likely to work to reduce the information asymmetry under which foreign
employees operate and consequently the number of claims that are not lodged in
the foreign proceeding because the employees are unaware of their right to do so.
As well, the ability of the primary insolvency administrator to offer “undertakings”
to creditors in secondary jurisdictions in order to avoid the institution of
secondary insolvency proceedings and the provisions of Chapter V providing
specifically for streamlining multi-entity insolvencies are likely to increase the
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Cf. SARRA STUDY supra note 4, at 34–35. If the two major options for funding the guarantee funds
are either (1) tax the businesses (with the ability to customize the tax’s application across different
industries); or (2) spread the cost across the entire national economy (either via a dedicated tax for
the guarantee fund or by funding the guarantee fund out of the State’s general fund—in either event
the result being the same), States faced with the choice of raising taxes in two generally unpopular
ways might, instead, change the structure of their insolvency regime, instead protecting employees
only with a guarantee fund, rather than with a hybrid approach.
This “net gain” to efficiency flows logically from the conclusion that Member States are not likely
to eliminate employee protections because of a changed implementation of the Guarantee Mandate,
but the change in implementation is likely to have an effect on the “drift” of insolvency regimes
within the European Union by virtue of the new incentives the changed implementation provides.
Thus, wholly independent of the fact that, under this dynamic approach, all employees in a given
State would receive the benefits of the State’s policy choices, all employees—indeed, all stakeholders
in the insolvency—could expect to benefit by virtue of the increasingly streamlined administration
of cross-border insolvencies.
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efficiency of insolvency administration in its entirety, thus allowing for efficiency
gains to accrue to all creditors, including the debtor’s employees.
However, the conjunction of the lack of specific provision for employee
claims beyond simply allowing for the lex fori to control and the provisions of the
Guarantee Mandate making the lex situs authoritative means that the wide range
of differences between the insolvency regimes of the different E.U. Member
States can limit the recovery employees receive. The national law governing
guarantee funds controls the employee’s recovery from the fund, but the lex fori
controls the employee’s recovery in the insolvency proceeding. The result is that
employees identically situated but for the headquarters of their employer would
secure different recoveries.
However, the provisions of the Guarantee Mandate and the E.U. Regulation
for integrating national law lead to a solution that can eliminate the disparities
between similarly-situated employees with regard to the satisfaction of employee
claims in insolvency proceedings. A slight change in the way Member States
implement the Guarantee Mandate can lead to the fuller expression of Member
States’ policy choices regarding employee protection in insolvency. Likewise, it
can improve the outcomes for employees of companies headquartered abroad as
a general matter as well as relative to their similarly situated counterparts that work
for domestic companies. Finally, if Member States change the way they implement
the Guarantee Mandate as outlined here, the resulting legal regime can further the
goals of the E.U.-wide regulations in increasing the efficiency of the
administration of cross-border insolvencies as a whole.
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